ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
he issue of what drives default is at the core of residential mortgage default literature. Studies of mortgage default usually consider the completion of the foreclosure process. However, there are many steps between the time a borrower stops making payments and foreclosure. At each scheduled payment date, a borrower can choose to make the mortgage payment, delay payment, stop payments completely, or pay the balance of the loan through refinancing or sale of the property. A borrower is considered to be delinquent on his mortgage when one payment has been completely missed and a second payment is due. Once a borrower misses three or more payments, he is considered to have defaulted. Lenders may then proceed with foreclosure.
When scheduled payments are not made, lenders cannot know whether borrowers are only delaying mortgage payments temporarily or stopping mortgage payments altogether. Borrowers may choose to become delinquent on a mortgage to address cash flow problems resulting from a decline in income or an increase in expenses. Delinquency is costly to both borrowers and lenders. For borrowers, delinquency costs include penalty fees and a lower credit rating. For lenders, slow loans may be almost as costly as loans that reach foreclosure. Moreover, a loan must necessarily be delinquent prior to foreclosure. Therefore, identifying the factors that drive delinquency and the transition from delinquency to foreclosure is important. This paper examines mortgage delinquency rates for loans in each state and Washington, DC from 2004 through 2009, a period characterized by sharp increases in borrower delinquency. The models incorporate information available to mortgage providers from the loan application about the borrower and the type of loan, as well as variables that capture economic conditions and shocks to income. The analysis provides information that will allow mortgage providers to improve assessments during underwriting and mortgage servicers to implement strategies that improve the default resolution process. The paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, we discuss determinants of mortgage delinquency. In the third section, we formulate an econometric model of mortgage delinquency rates. In the fourth section, we present data on mortgage delinquency rates across the US. In the fifth section, we present our empirical analysis. Our conclusions are presented in the sixth section. Capozza and Thomson (2006) find that subprime lenders delay foreclosure proceedings for borrowers with weaker credit ratings and loans with higher interest rate premiums. Subprime loans that become seriously delinquent are about twice as likely as prime loans to foreclose, but they take four times longer to get there. Loans with shorter delinquency periods are more likely to cure.
In general, much of the research on the factors that drive mortgage delinquency is conducted on individual loans held in portfolios. Drawing from this literature, we model mortgage delinquency rates for loans in each state and Washington, DC for the period 2004 through 2009 using variables that can be classified into the following three categories: 1) borrower characteristics; 2) loan characteristics; and 3) economic conditions and shocks to income. The affect these variables have on delinquency rates is estimated in cross-sectional time-series regressions. Prime and subprime loans are modeled separately to capture differences in the performance of these loans.
MODEL OF US MORTGAGE DELINQUENCY RATES
We use a two-way fixed effects model to examine cross-sectional time series data on mortgage delinquency rates in the US. Our data consists of delinquency rates for all fifty states and Washington, DC for the period 2004 through 2009. Therefore, there are fifty-one cross-sectional observations and six time series observations. Greene (2003) expresses the two-way fixed effects model as follows: Since the dataset is balanced, we can write the following:
where the symbols: 
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The two-way fixed effects model is simply a regression of it ỹ on it x . Therefore, the two-way  is given by:
The calculations of cross section dummy variables, time dummy variables, and intercepts follows. Denote the cross-sectional effects by  and the time effects by  . These effects are calculated from the following relations:
Denote the cross-sectional dummy variables and time dummy variables with the superscript C and T. When no intercept is specified, the dummy equations can be written as follows:
The sum of squared errors is:
The estimated error variance can be written:
The variance covariance matrix of S  is given by
The variance covariance matrix of the dummy variables is specified as follows: 
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DATA
The data on delinquency rates are from the Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey and are for the period 2004 through 2009. Figure 1 shows delinquency rates for all prime loans and those that are categorized as 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, and seriously delinquent (90+ day). During the sample period, delinquency rates for prime loans increased from 2.4 percent to 5.6 percent -a 130 percent increase. The largest increase occurred between 2008 and 2009. This rapid one-year increase in delinquency rates was driven by loans that were 90-day and seriously delinquent. The explanatory variables used to estimate delinquency rates for each state and the proposed direction of influence are provided in Table 1 . A trend analysis for each independent variable is provided in the paragraphs that follow. The impact of borrower race on delinquency is expected to vary across race. Borrower race does not imply, for example, that being Hispanic will increase delinquency, but captures unobserved factors unique to being Hispanic that may influence delinquency. In some cases, minorities experience greater variation in income. This is expected to increase delinquency risk. Figure 4 captures the percent of female borrowers -fempct. In view of the disparity in income between males and females, referred to as the "gender gap in earnings", it is assumed that females' ability to pay is impaired by the gap. As a result, being a female borrower should increase mortgage delinquency. The percent share of female borrowers has increased over time ranging from 6.9 to 7.3 percent. It is assumed that the ability to refinance, particularly out of a bad loan, will decrease delinquency. Also, it is assumed that borrowers that refinance mortgage loans have more experience handling mortgage payments. This should also reduce risk of delinquency. Figure 13 captures the percent of applications that were not approved -denpct. Higher denial rates suggest higher credit standards, lower credit risk, and lower defaults. There are, however, divergent patterns of denial rates 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our review of the results focuses on identifying factors that explain delinquency rates for prime and subprime loans. For each type of loan, models are estimated for 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, seriously delinquent (90+ day), and all loans using independent variables that represent: 1) borrower characteristics; 2) loan characteristics; and 3) economic conditions and shocks to income. Table 2 provides the regression results for prime and subprime 30-day delinquency rates. For both models, R 2 exceeds 0.98. The variable that significantly explains 30-day delinquency rates for both prime and subprime loans and exhibits the expected direction of influence is house price index (economic condition). For prime loans, the percent of NIV loans and the percent of refinance loans (loan characteristics) significantly explain 30-day delinquency rates. For subprime loans, income (borrower characteristic), percent of non-owner occupied loans, percent of NIV loans, and the percent of refinance loans (loan characteristics) and number of housing permits issued (economic condition) significantly explain 30-day delinquency rates. The regression results suggest the following:  30-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for prime and subprime loans. NIV loans are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments. These loans are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  30-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of refinance loans increases for prime and subprime loans. This relationship may signify that borrowers who are experienced with mortgage payments may choose to stop making payments temporarily to smooth consumption. Therefore, we would expect to see a positive relationship between percent of refinance loans and 30-day and 60-day delinquency rates and a negative relationship between 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates because foreclosure filings may proceed after the third payment is missed. Our findings are consistent with this expectation.  For subprime loans, 30-day delinquency rates increase with borrower income. This relationship may signify that high income borrowers may choose to stop making payments temporarily to smooth consumption. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable because there is a positive relationship between income and 30-day delinquency rates and no relationship between 60-day, 90-day, and 90+ day delinquency rates.  For subprime loans, 30-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of non-owner occupied loans increases. This result may signify that these borrowers view credit impairment that results from skipping mortgage payments to be too costly. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  For subprime loans, 30-day delinquency rates increase as the number of building permits increase. This result may signify lagged increases in housing inventory leading to falling house prices. This is consistent with studies which demonstrate a rapid buildup of housing stock in subprime neighborhoods followed by dramatic declines in house prices. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. Table 3 provides the regression results for prime and subprime 60-day delinquency rates. For both models, R 2 exceeds 0.96. The variables that significantly explain 60-day delinquency rates for both prime and subprime loans and exhibit the expected direction of influence are unemployment rate and house price index (economic conditions). Also, income (borrower characteristic) exhibits the expected direction of influence for prime loans. For prime loans, the percent of NIV loans (loan characteristic) and the percent of denials (economic condition) significantly explain 60-day delinquency rates. For subprime loans, the percent of African American borrowers (borrower characteristic), percent of non-owner occupied loans, percent of NIV loans, percent of refinance loans (loan characteristics), percent denials and number of housing permits issued (economic conditions) significantly explain 60-day delinquency rates. The regression results suggest the following:  60-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for prime and subprime loans. NIV loans are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments. These loans are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  60-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of denials increases for prime and subprime loans. Increased denial rates may be capturing an increase in applications from less creditworthy borrowers. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  For subprime loans, 60-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of African American borrowers increases. This result may signify that African Americans face greater income variation, increasing delinquency risk.  60-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of refinance loans increases for subprime loans. This relationship may signify that borrowers who are experienced with mortgage payments may choose to stop making payments temporarily to smooth consumption. Therefore, we would expect to see a positive relationship between percent of refinance loans and 30-day and 60-day delinquency rates and a negative relationship between 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates because foreclosure filings may proceed after the third payment is missed. Our findings are consistent with this expectation.  For subprime loans, 60-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of non-owner occupied loans increases. This result may signify that these borrowers view credit impairment that results from skipping mortgage payments to be too costly. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.
Journal of Business & Economics Research -February, 2011
Volume 9, Number 2 42 © 2011 The Clute Institute  For subprime loans, 60-day delinquency rates increase as the number of building permits increase. This result may signify lagged increases in housing inventory leading to falling house prices. This is consistent with studies which demonstrate a rapid buildup of housing stock in subprime neighborhoods followed by dramatic declines in house prices. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. Table 4 provides the regression results for prime and subprime 90-day delinquency rates. For both models, R 2 exceeds 0.86. The variable that significantly explains 90-day delinquency rates for both prime and subprime loans and exhibits the expected direction of influence is unemployment rate (economic condition). Also, income (borrower characteristic), percent of refinance loans, and percent of adjustable rate mortgages (loan characteristics) exhibit the expected direction of influence for prime loans. House price index (economic condition) exhibits the expected direction of influence for subprime loans. For prime and subprime loans, the percent of denials (economic condition) significantly explains 90-day delinquency rates. For subprime loans, the percent of NIV loans (loan characteristic), the percent of Asian American borrowers (borrower characteristic) and the number of building permits (economic condition) significantly explain 90-day delinquency rates. The regression results suggest the following:
 90-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of denials increases for prime and subprime loans. Increased denial rates may be capturing an increase in applications from less creditworthy borrowers. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  90-day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for subprime loans. NIV loans are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments. These loans are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  For subprime loans, 90-day delinquency rates increase as the percent of Asian American borrowers increases. This result may signify that Asian Americans face greater income variation, increasing delinquency risk.
Volume 9, Number 2 © 2011 The Clute Institute 43  For subprime loans, 90-day delinquency rates increase as the number of building permits increase. This result may signify lagged increases in housing inventory leading to falling house prices. This is consistent with studies which demonstrate a rapid buildup of housing stock in subprime neighborhoods followed by dramatic declines in house prices. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. Table 5 provides the regression results for prime and subprime 90+ day delinquency rates. For both models, R 2 exceeds 0.94. The variables that significantly explain 90+ day delinquency rates for both prime and subprime loans and exhibit the expected direction of influence are unemployment rate, house price index (economic conditions), percent of refinance loans, and percent of adjustable rate mortgages (loan characteristics). Also, income (borrower characteristic) and number of building permits (economic condition) exhibit the expected direction of influence for prime loans. For prime and subprime loans, the percent of denials (economic condition), percent of NIV loans (loan characteristic), and the percent of Hispanic American borrowers (borrower characteristic) significantly explain 90+ day delinquency rates. For prime loans, the percent of Asian and Native American borrowers significantly explain 90+ day delinquency rates. For subprime loans, the percent of loans with subordinate liens (loan characteristic) significantly explains 90+ day delinquency rates. The regression results suggest the following:  90+ day delinquency rates increase as the percent of denials increases for prime and subprime loans. Increased denial rates may be capturing an increase in applications from less creditworthy borrowers. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  90+ day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for prime and subprime loans. NIV loans are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments. These loans are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  90+ day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of Hispanic American borrowers increase for prime and subprime loans. This finding may signify that lenders pursue foreclosure more rapidly with these borrowers. Otherwise, these borrowers may attempt to avoid prolonged delinquency because of the credit impairment associated with foreclosure.
Volume 9, Number 2 44 © 2011 The Clute Institute  90+ day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of Asian and Native American borrowers increase for prime loans. This finding may signify that lenders pursue foreclosure more rapidly with these borrowers. Otherwise, these borrowers may attempt to avoid prolonged delinquency because of the credit impairment associated with foreclosure.  90+ day delinquency rates decrease as the percent of loans with subordinate liens increases for subprime loans. This finding may signify that lenders pursue foreclosure more rapidly for these borrowers. Table 6 provides the regression results for all prime and subprime delinquency rates. For both models, R 2 exceeds 0.96. The variables that significantly explain delinquency rates for both prime and subprime loans and exhibit the expected direction of influence are unemployment rate and house price index (economic conditions). Also, income (borrower characteristic) exhibits the expected direction of influence for prime loans. For prime and subprime loans, the percent of denials (economic condition) and the percent of NIV loans (loan characteristic) significantly explain delinquency rates. For subprime loans, the percent of Asian borrowers (borrower characteristic) and the number of building permits (economic condition) significantly explain delinquency rates. The regression results suggest the following:  delinquency rates increase as the percent of denials increases for prime and subprime loans. Increased denial rates may be capturing an increase in applications from less creditworthy borrowers. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  delinquency rates decrease as the percent of NIV loans increases for prime and subprime loans. NIV loans are primarily approved for borrowers with very high credit scores and sizeable down payments. These loans are considered to be of very high quality with low levels of default risk. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable.  delinquency rates increase as the percent of Asian American borrowers increases for subprime loans. This result may signify that Asian Americans face greater income variation, increasing delinquency risk.
Volume 9, Number 2 © 2011 The Clute Institute 45  delinquency rates increase as the number of building permits increases for subprime loans. This result may signify lagged increases in housing inventory leading to falling house prices. This is consistent with studies which demonstrate a rapid buildup of housing stock in subprime neighborhoods followed by dramatic declines in house prices. Therefore, the regression results seem reasonable. Overall, the factors that significantly influence delinquency rates are:

Borrower characteristics -Income reduces all delinquency rates for prime borrowers, except 30-day delinquency rates.  Loan characteristics -NIV loans reduce delinquency rates. ARMs increase 90-day delinquency rates for prime loans and 90+ day delinquency rates for prime and subprime loans. Refinance loans increase 30-and 60-day delinquency rates and reduce 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates.  Economic conditions -Growth in the house price index reduces delinquency rates. Unemployment and denials increase all delinquency rates, except 30-day delinquency rates.
These results suggest that borrower income, type of loan, and the general health of the economy remain important in determining delinquency risk. Also, factors that determine 30-and 60-day delinquency rates differ from those that determine 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates. Economic conditions such as unemployment rate and denials do not affect 30-day delinquency rates. However, these factors are important in explaining 60-day, 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates. Similarly, refinance loans increase 30-and 60-day delinquency rates and reduce 90-day and 90+ day delinquency rates. This suggests that borrowers with experience making mortgage payments may temporarily skip payments but will avoid the risk of foreclosure by catching up when the third payment is due. Also, factors that determine prime delinquency rates differ from those that determine subprime delinquency rates. Income reduces prime loan delinquency rates, except for 30-day delinquencies. However, income is only significant in explaining 30-day delinquency rates for subprime loans and the relationship is positive. Also, the number of building permits increases subprime loan delinquency rates, except for 90+ day delinquencies. However, the number of building permits is only significant in explaining 90+ day delinquency rates for prime loans and the relationship is negative. Finally, borrower race does not consistently explain delinquency rates. In some cases,
